Between European liberal democracy and Russian imperialism.

Recent elections in Georgia and Moldova resulted in mixed outcomes but illustrated a shared issue. Despite the current governments’ vocal commitments to EU memberships, the countries are far from unanimously in favour. The situations of Georgia and Moldova have stark similarities: former Soviet republics, recent EU candidate members, and struggling with pro-Russian separatist territories. These similarities were reflected in the elections’ main issue at stake: the choice between a liberal democratic future in the EU or an autocratic future in the Russian orbit. The election results were, however, different.  

While Moldova narrowly re-elected the pro-European Maiu Sandu as president, the Russian-sympathetic Georgian Dream party made a sound victory in the parliament. Accusations of Russian meddling in both countries appeared already before results were announced. An analysis of the countries’ identity struggles can help understand the highly contested elections. Furthermore, this article maps out how the election results have impacted the road towards EU membership. 

Elections smeared with dirt

The first round of the Moldovan presidential elections was held on 20 October 2024. Because no candidate received a majority of votes, a second round was held two weeks later. The first round was won by incumbent president Maiu Sandu, who got 42.49% of the votes. Since her first term started in 2020, Sandu has put Moldova on a decisive pro-European track. Sandu was followed by independent candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, a member of the Gagauz minority and endorsed by the Socialist Party. Similar to Sandu, he also took a pro-European stance although emphasising the need for friendly relations with other countries as well. He eventually secured 44.65 in the second round, losing to Sandu who won with 55.35%. 

The elections were paired with a referendum on a new provision in the constitution. This would put Moldova’s commitment to EU membership in the Moldovan Constitution. Such a provision was added to the Georgian constitution several years ago already. The Moldovan referendum was narrowly approved by 50.35%. This victory for the pro-EU camp was largely thanks to the overwhelming support from the large Moldovan diaspora abroad. About 54% of the voters within Moldova rejected constitutionally enshrining Moldova’s EU commitment. A similar pattern could be seen in the presidential elections, especially in the second round. While Stoianoglo was set to win at the beginning of the election evening, Sandu took over closer to midnight, when votes from abroad were counted. Sandu got most of her domestic support in the capital and centre of the country. Stoianoglo got most of his support in the North, South and East. These regions are more rural and have Russian and Gagauz minorities. The low turnout of only slightly more than 50% in both rounds shows general disengagement, which could be caused by systemic frustrations.

The Georgian parliamentary elections took place on 26 October 2024. Before the elections, the 150-seat parliament was dominated by the populist Georgian Dream party, which is informally led by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party’s Honorary Chair. In this position, Ivanishvili nominates the presidential and prime ministerial candidates, and he is regarded as the ‘spiritual leader’ of the Georgian Dream. Although the party often portrays itself as pro-Western, recently adopted legislature, especially the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence made itself look more pro-Russian. Similar laws were previously introduced in Hungary and Kyrgyzstan, both inspired by the Russian Foreign Agent Act that entered into force in 2012. The law targets independent civil society organisations, which are key for a well-functioning democracy. These organisations often receive funding from abroad, an excuse used by the government to frame those as ‘foreign agents’. Other recently adopted controversial legislatures are the anti-LGBTQ+ Law and the “Offshore Law”. The latter is believed to protect Ivanishvili’s business interests by tax exemptions. Besides, the government spread anti-EU propaganda, creating fears about the EU erasing Georgia’s identity and warning for the “gaysation” of Georgian men. 

The Georgian opposition is highly fragmented, with an attempt to have a unified front failing. About four pro-Western party groups managed to meet the 5% threshold. The Georgian Dream, however, won 89 out of 150 seats – one seat less than in the 2020 elections. The electoral campaigns were dominated by an aggressive attitude from the Georgian Dream, especially regarding the war in Ukraine. In the Georgian Dream’s “No War, Choose Peace” campaign, the war-torn schools, churches, streets, parks, and theatres in Ukraine were compared to the modern and well-maintained equivalents in Georgia. This way, the Georgian Dream attempted to frame the elections as a choice between war and stability.  

It is questionable whether the elections in the two countries were fully free and fair. Already before the first round of the Moldovan presidential elections, rumours spread of massive vote buying in favour of pro-Russian candidates and against the EU referendum. These rumours were further stimulated by videos circulating on the internet, including a shocking documentary, in which undercover journalists catch many instances of vote buying. At the same time, it did not influence the elections to such a degree that it changed the outcome. It is, however, a warning for future elections, especially the Moldovan parliamentary elections in early Summer 2025. 

In Georgia, however, there were considerably stronger suspicions on whether the elections were free and fair. International observers have reported irregularities in the elections. Because of the alleged fraud, protests broke out in Tbilisi after the results were announced. Although the Georgian Dream was expected to win, the big margin was highly unexpected. In the immediate aftermath, the opposition and many European countries called for an investigation, which the Georgian Dream government refused. A (partial) recount did not lead to changed results. 

Revolution in Georgia?

Although the aftermath in Moldova is rather quiet, a revolution seems to burst in Georgia. Since the election results were announced, tensions have been rising in the country. A tipping point was reached on Thursday 28th of November. The European Parliament called for new elections in Georgia. In response to this call, the Georgian prime minister (Georgian Dream) announced the suspension of EU accession talks until at least 2028. The decision led to large protests in Tbilisi, which were violently suppressed by the police. 

“I barely sleep these days,” says Dato Dolaberidze, a Georgian student living in Vienna, a couple of days after the protests started. Before moving to Vienna, Dolaberidze used to be part of student protests and a resistance movement at his university in Tbilisi. He took part in the anti-government protests in April and May. Following the protests at a distance is tough:  “I am the whole time following all developments, and the situation is very stressful. It is hard to witness these events from afar – it used to be my daily life: work, study, protest.” 

Although Dolaberidze is worried about the violence – especially since many of his friends in Tbilisi are participating in the protests – he has hope: “Many high public officials are resigning, including ambassadors in several European countries, such as the USA, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. A petition condemning the decision of the Georgian Dream and the government has been initiated within public services. The petition is already signed by approximately 300 officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 400 from the Ministry of Justice. Also, high-ranked civil servants in other ministries are resigning, and the army is unlikely to side with the government. This way, the system destroys itself from within.” 

The president, Salome Zourabichvili, is currently refusing to step down after the parliament decided to end her presidency. Zourabichvili, who is seen as the leader of the opposition, says to resist this decision because of the parliament’s illegitimacy after the rigged elections. She was elected as president in 2018. Due to recent reforms, the president is no longer directly elected, but appointed by the parliament.  

A disputed future

The polarised elections are the reflection of deep division within the societies of Georgia and Moldova. Ever since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries have been struggling to build robust institutions and phase out corruption. Prominent oligarchs hamper positive reforms. In Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili is seen as the actual person pulling the strings of Georgian politics. Ivanishvili made his fortune during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2024, his net worth is about $5 billion, equal to about a quarter of Georgia’s GDP. In 2012, he founded Georgian Dream. After a short period of prime ministership from late 2012 until late 2013, he took a step back from politics. Since 2018, he has been back within Georgian Dream, which has been dominating Georgian politics since its first electoral participation in 2012. In the past few years, Ivanishvili managed to build a cult of personality, partly through philanthropic actions such as opening an amusement park and buying an old Georgian holy book at a Christie’s auction. For a part of Georgia’s society, he is considered the “defender of Georgian identity”. The seeming shift of Ivanishvili’s party, from initially pro-EU and pro-liberal democracy, to a more illiberal Russian-friendly attitude in recent years, is remarkable. 

Moldova’s political scene has also been dominated by an oligarch, although in a slightly different way. Vladimir Plahotniuc is a businessman, having made his fortune in a variety of sectors including oil, real estate and banking. In 2010, he entered parliament representing the Social Democratic Party. Later, he became the party’s chairman. Plahotniuc is known for the so-called ‘theft of the century’. He is suspected of having stolen $1 billion of public money in 2014, via the construction of public and private institutions. In June 2019, he resigned as party chairman and fled the country. Initially residing in Turkey, he is now reported to be in Northern Cyprus. Plahotniuc is also on the international arrest list of Russia, because he is accused of having ordered the assassination of Russian businessman German Gorbuntsov – possibly for business interests. It appears that he currently does not play any role in Moldovan politics. Besides, he is different from the usual post-Soviet oligarchs, who are normally closely tied to Putin. 

The vacuum left by Plahotniuc was quickly filled by Ilan Șor, who also played a vital role in the 2014 fraud scandal. Șor is a pro-Russian oligarch, born in Israel in 1987. His national conservative Șor party currently has 6 out of 101 seats in the Moldovan parliament and was briefly banned by the constitutional court for promoting the interests of Russia and undermining Moldovan independence. His party is suspected of receiving Russian bribes, which was a major issue during the electoral campaigns.   

Similarities are also visible in the geopolitical sphere. Both Moldova and Georgia are struggling with separatist territories. In Moldova, the pro-Russian region Transnistria has been functioning as a de facto independent country since the Transnistrian war in the 1990s. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised alarm bells in Moldova’s capital Chisinau: Russian advancements in Southern Ukraine could create a land bridge connecting Russia with Transnistria which could potentially further destabilise the country. Fears for the war spreading to Moldova are shared among most of the political spectrum, especially if Odessa would fall under Russian control. Currently, however, it is unlikely that Russian troops will cross the Dnieper. 

In Georgia, the north-located Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions have been occupied by Russian troops since respectively 1993 and 2008. Abkhazia fell to Russian control after Georgia lost the Abkhazian War in 1992-1993. More territory was lost in the 2008 invasion when Russian troops also managed to annex the Tskhinvali region. The latter was declared the “Republic of South Ossetia”. Both entities are only recognised by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. Russia deploys a strategy of “creeping occupation”, meaning that the border of South-Ossetia is slowly expanded every year by militaries moving the fences. All aforementioned separatist territories are strongly pro-Russian. 

The separatist territories are symptoms of the countries’ fragile statehood vis-á-vis Russia. This became especially clear with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Since Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy has been focused on enhancing its position in former Soviet countries. By helping Russia-friendly regimes or destabilising liberal democratic states, Putin has managed to pull several countries into its orbit. Belarus has been the most successful case, which forms a union together with Russia. Ukraine has been gradually shifting outside of Russia’s sphere of influence, which made Putin decide to invade its Eastern regions in 2014, followed by a full-scale invasion in 2022. Undoubtedly unintentionally, the latter has accelerated efforts by Georgia and Moldova to join both NATO and the EU. 

Russia’s effort to forcefully assert influence in its neighbouring countries fits Putin’s worldview. This worldview is largely shaped by his notion of the Soviet Union’s collapse as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”, a statement he made in 2005. In a speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin called the eastward expansion of NATO a ‘threat’ to Russia. It explains Russian assertiveness ever since. At the same time, the EU is also increasingly present, leading to a struggle for influence in the region between the EU and Russia. 

The EU’s interests for enlargement to the East are less obvious but the answer is somewhere between geopolitics and ideology. Rhetoric by EU leaders, such as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, is idealistic and seems to suggest a commitment to spreading liberal democracy to other countries and welcoming neighbouring countries in the ‘European family’. At the same time, geopolitical considerations seem to have led to earlier expansions. Bulgaria, for example, has been struggling with its rule of law ever since its accession in 2007, which makes it questionable whether the EU is indeed committed to strengthening countries’ rule of law. Different, however, from a more obvious outlier – Hungary – Bulgaria has always been vocally supporting the EU, and not Russia. The sudden candidate status of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in 2022 seemed to have been more a response to the tight geopolitical situation, than to improvements regarding the countries’ rule of law and economic policies. 

EU membership 

Moldova received EU candidate status in Spring 2022, together with Ukraine. Georgia followed in November 2023, after the government completed a list of ‘priorities’ for strengthening the rule of law. Remarkable, however, is that several prioritised reforms did not take place. The EU’s decision to grant Georgia candidate status could potentially be more of a reward for the Georgian population’s strong support for membership (about 85% supports membership). 

In the Commission’s most recent enlargement reports (published on 30 October 2024), the Commission is highly critical of recent developments in Georgia, including on the list of priorities. The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence is especially a step back. Also in other fields, such as alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, the Commission is rather negative about Georgia’s efforts towards EU membership. According to the Commission, Georgia’s foreign and security policy only aligns with 49% of the EU’s. In several fields, the Commission even reports backsliding, for example regarding the area of judiciary and fundamental rights, as well as the position of civil society organisations. On economic matters, only limited progress has been made. 

The situation is less gloomy in Moldova. The persistent pro-European Maiu Sandu and her Party of Action and Solidarity have been pushing Moldova into a liberal democratic direction since seizing power in both the presidential palace and the parliament in 2019. So far, it is paying off: accession negotiations between the EU and Moldova started on 10 July. The good steps are also reflected in the most recent enlargement report. In all key fields, the Commission reports progress. In several fields, such as energy, taxation and customs union, the Commission reports even ‘good progress’ (while Georgia does not make ‘good progress’ in any field). In contrast to Georgia, Moldova’s foreign policy is increasingly in line with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, although the Commission does not mention an exact rate. 

For both countries, it will take at least several years until EU accession can be realised. Besides, being a candidate member state does not have to result in actual membership, as reflected in the perpetual candidate status of Turkey since the negotiations were frozen in 2016. Moldova has set a target date of 2030 for accession, similar to the Ukrainian target date. Political willpower will be decisive for its course towards EU membership. Montenegro and Serbia have been negotiating since 2012 and 2014 respectively, which, so far, has been far from successful. These countries differ from Moldova and Georgia in terms of popular sentiments, especially in Serbia. An opinion poll in early 2024 shows that only 40% of the Serbs would vote in favour of EU membership. 

The Moldovan parliamentary elections in the Summer of 2025 is Moldova’s next test for measuring support for membership. Also, developments in Ukraine will influence its path towards membership. Ukraine’s successes towards EU membership are likely to have a spillover effect in Moldova, as both countries have been teaming up since the countries submitted their applications to the EU in Spring 2022. The situation in Georgia is less bright. With the questionable Georgian Dream in power, a big leap forward in the accession process is unlikely. 

At the same time, the government’s accelerated regime of oppression has created, so far, primarily backlash. During the weekend of Saturday 30 November, more than a hundred thousand people went on the streets of Tbilisi. The opposition is less fragmented than before, although the opposition parties are considerably less organised than the Georgian Dream. Their role in the current events is minimal, as protests are self-organised by civic activists rather than being led by the opposition. Although there are currently no signs that the protestors’ demands will be fulfilled, the constantly increasing pressure caused by broad societal backlash could still force the government to back down. 

Gratitude is extended to Dato Dolaberidze and Laurentiu Vlas for the valuable contributions

Indigo Tjan is an MA Political Science student at the Central European University in Vienna. Previously, he studied at University College Utrecht. His main focus is Central- and Eastern Europe.

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