The Hidden Costs of Decarbonisation

Analysing the implications of the EU-Rwanda raw minerals deal on EU’s sustainability leadership.
Since its introduction in 2020, the European Union (EU) Green Deal has become a buzzword in EU (and international) politics. With this deal, the continent embarked on a mission to halve CO2 emissions by 2030 and even aim to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.
This deal, outlining suggested actions meant to transition the European energy sector towards more efficient and renewable energy sources, has been written about before by editors here at Shaping Europe. In 2020, authors for example discussed the opportunity of the EU to take a leadership role in the transition towards sustainability, before further commenting on the need for rare-earth minerals in said transition, calling for sustainable mining practices.
However, this year has seen several important developments regarding the initiation of the deal, specifically regarding rare-earth minerals. This calls for further investigation of the EU’s actions and the extent to which the continent is successfully taking on a leading role in the transition towards climate neutrality.
EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding
As highlighted by the second article mentioned above, current plans for ‘decarbonisation’ will require substantial amounts of raw materials, especially in the form of rare-earth minerals used for electrification, such as lithium, cobalt and copper. This has arguably led to a sense of global urgency, with both private and public actors scrambling to get hold of the resources needed to meet their ‘green objectives’. Yet, although Europe hosts reserves of key minerals, plans to initiate mining on the continent face strong opposition from local residents, often pointing to the negative impacts of the mines on the local environment.
Consequently, the EU needed to look elsewhere. In February this year, the EU and Rwanda introduced their new ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains’ (MoU). This MoU explicitly aims to ‘strengthen Rwanda’s role in fostering sustainable development and resilient value chains across Africa’. It further establishes close cooperation between the EU and Rwanda in research and capacity building, aiming to build links and collaboration between Rwandan mining activities and the European market.
The statement argues that, for the EU, this partnership will ‘contribute to ensuring a sustainable supply of raw materials’, being an essential prerequisite for delivering on the bloc’s ‘green and clean’ energy objectives. It also states that as mineral value chains are critical to Rwanda’s economy, the country can become a ‘hub for value addition’ in the mineral sector, pointing to the value of this deal for the Rwandan government.
Looted Minerals?
However, soon after the deal was made public, it faced large amounts of criticism, with many specifically pointing to Rwanda’s recent involvement in the ongoing conflict in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC has an incredible amount of mineral resources, including copper, diamonds, tin and tungsten. Additionally, the country contains more than 49% of the world’s known cobalt reserves, and is the 7th largest mining producer globally (for all metals and minerals). However, mineral extraction in the country is currently characterised by a lack of transparency, accountability, and government effectiveness against corruption. Moreover, the country is struggling to combat the exploitation and illegal trade of minerals on its territory.
Interestingly, a United Nations (UN) report from 2020 has been casting a spotlight on Rwanda’s involvement in what it refers to as ‘sophisticated smuggling networks’, extracting gold and coltan from Congolese conflict zones. This report argues that Rwandan actors are illicitly funnelling the valuable resources from the DRC into Rwanda’s global consumer chain for rare minerals. The authors also suggest that this explains why Rwanda recently has become one of the world’s biggest coltan exporters, despite having few producing mines of its own. This is a claim that also has been echoed by the DRC’s Finance minister, Nicolas Kazadi, stating that Rwandan smuggling of Congolese minerals is costing the DRC over $1 billion per year.
Is the EU exacerbating the Congo-Rwanda conflict?
Thus, this brings up questions regarding the origins of Rwandan minerals, and what is currently going on within the DRC-Rwanda border regions. The two neighbouring countries have a long and violent history of conflicts, and Al Jazeera estimates that since the start of violence in the DRC in 1997, more than 6 million people have lost their lives. Additionally, 2022 saw a further intensification of the fighting, mainly due to the resurfacing of rebel militia group M23. This group was formed in 2012 as a reaction against the government’s failed implementation of a peace agreement, and has recently grown to become one of the most active non-state armed groups in the country.
Once again, mineral resources have been a big factor in the current crisis, with various armed groups battling for control of mines and using the earnings to fund their wars. More importantly, the DRC has been accusing Rwanda of funding M23, and providing weapons and personnel to capture strategic areas and towns. This was also echoed by a 2022 UN Report, providing photographic evidence of Rwandan military personnel together with the militant group. Although denied by Rwanda, anti-Rwanda protests have been erupting throughout the DRC, with demonstrators burning Rwandan flags, as well as those of Western countries seen to be supporting Rwanda.
Furthermore, the Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi recently claimed that Rwanda was plundering Congo’s mineral resources, consequently ‘exporting wealth that it does not have’. Tshisekedi further highlighted the link between Rwanda and M23, stating that ‘with the proceeds of these illicit sales, they will equip their armies and continue their ambitions in Congo’. This has caused journalists around the world to call the EU-Rwanda deal highly ‘controversial’, also pointing to the involvement of M23 in the mineral mines around the Eastern conflict areas. Thus, there is a need to once again question how ‘clean’ the extraction of these minerals is, and whether it may instead exacerbate the ongoing conflicts in the region.
The Costs of Decarbonisation
Looking at the wider picture, many of the key minerals needed for the production of renewable technologies can be found in countries of the ‘Global South’ (a term referring to post-colonial and lower-income countries). The International Institute for Sustainable Development writes how this increased demand should be ‘an economic boom’ to countries hosting reserves of minerals like cobalt and lithium, with increased foreign investments having the potential to ‘result in increased revenues to the state from taxes and royalties, improved infrastructure, more jobs, and increased spending on local businesses, health and education’.
However, many argue that this is not the case, as although the extraction of these minerals promises a ‘greener’ future for Western societies, much of the social and environmental harm is instead externalised to the Global South. Critics thus claim that the ongoing energy transition is premised upon an ‘extractivist logic’ reproducing old colonial patterns of uneven development. For example, some argue that the EU is creating ‘sacrifice zones’, seeing how residents in Europe can enjoy ‘clean’ energy, while local Congolese populations are subjected to intensified violence and heightened levels of pollution.
Yet, what sets current activities apart from colonial extractivism is arguably the justification behind it, making it difficult to condemn. Looking at low-carbon sources and renewable energy, these are often framed as more equitable, egalitarian and just than traditional carbon-intensive alternatives. Additionally, while previous extractive projects were often justified in terms of ‘national-level benefits’ (supposedly outweighing local-level harms), new extractive mining projects are rather justified in terms of a ‘global necessity’. Thus, as states agree on the collective need for a green transition, projects that might before have been difficult to justify (both in terms of environmental and social costs) may now become more acceptable, and even deemed essential for urgent and effective climate action.
Need for EU Leadership
Globally, there is a clear need for a transition towards renewable resources, and with the Green Deal, the EU stepped in as a leader in the field. Jutta Urpilainen, the former European Commissioner for International Partnerships, stated that the bloc’s recent focus on securing raw materials is not only about trade and investments but rather about ‘the planet and the people who will benefit from a sustainable, transparent and resilient value chain of critical raw materials’.
The EU-Rwanda deal represents one step towards the continent expanding its renewable energy production. However, many argue that this deal failed to consider its potential negative implications on the conflict in the region, ignoring the many red flags surrounding Rwandan mineral production, as already highlighted by actors such as the UN. Interestingly, following several weeks of criticism, the European Commission released a statement condemning the recent offensive by M23 in DRC. However, many argue that Rwanda’s involvement in DRC ‘was well-known to the EU when it entered into the agreement’, questioning the intentions behind the new statement and if it will make a difference.
There is already an unequal burden faced by nations due to the effects of climate change, with countries of the Global South arguably having to deal with the results of excessive emissions from the Global North. Consequently, it is now important to ensure that the transition towards a more sustainable planet does not follow the same patterns, once again leading to an unequal burden being placed on the countries producing the key minerals needed for a global transition.
Looking at the EU’s goal to become a leader in the field of sustainability, providing a pathway for other continents to follow, the bloc arguably has a responsibility to engage in sustainable and just mining practices. By rushing into questionable deals, potentially sourcing minerals looted from war zones, the EU instead fails to set a standard, making us question exactly how ‘just’ the green transition will be.
Agnes holds a BASc in Global Sustainable Development from the University of Warwick, a MSc in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam, and a MSc in Migration Studies from Universitat Pompeu Fabra. She has experience working within European Civil Society, and is now exploring the world of journalism.
Image: Shutterstock